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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this discussion material will be to examine the effects of fiscal developments on economic 
activity and on the market condition over time. The study employs a threshold vector autoregressive 
approach for 10 Developing and Emerging Market economies in the Central Eastern and South 
Eastern European Countries. The financial stress index is constructed by considering a wide range of 
market patterns, including banking related stress, money market related stress, exchange markets 
stress and real estate markets related stress, upon which the threshold upon market condition is build. 
The threshold VAR model allows to analyses this interrelationship during episodes of economic 
downturn and stress in financial market. Finally, the empirical work considers a structural identification 
approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Economic doctrines still remains bivalent on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, being mainly 
divided into two schools of thought (Classical and Keynesian) that argue mostly on the effect of fiscal 
policy on economic activity and macroeconomic stability. According to Li and Amant (2010) the 
debate has received renewed interest in the light of various episodes of significant financial stress (e.g. 
Asian crisis, high tech boom and bust, and most importantly the recent global financial and economic 
crisis), which have usually revealed the strong interrelation between financial markets stress persistence 
and macroeconomic dynamics. Most importantly, after an initial period of resilience, the financial 
turmoil by 2007 in advanced economies was quickly transmitted to the developing and emerging 
markets. Thus, by late 2008, most of developing and emerging countries have been confronted to the 
effects and post-effects of this financial turmoil mainly via the financial and trade linkages 
[Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag and Tytell, (2009)]. During this period, financial market tumbling 
were accompanied by slowdown in private capital inflows in developing and emerging markets, while 
spreads on sovereign debt widened and exchange markets came under pressure with most of the 
countries experiencing sharp and huge currency depreciation. At the same time, economy equity and 
debt funds saw significant withdrawals, and lending by advanced economies’ banks dropped 
precipitously reflecting both a weakened outlook and the need for banks to de-leverage. Further to 
that, countries were faced with lower or/and negative economic growth. While fiscal stimulus could 
                                                          
* Gerti Shijaku, Research Department, Bank of Albania, e-mail: gshijaku@bankofalbania.org 
  The views expressed herein are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Albania. 
 
 
- 2 - 
smooth the negative effects of shocks, most of these economies faced hard budget constraints. Higher 
debt burdens and great financing needs to support fiscal stimulus to enable economic recovery placed 
more stress to financial markets via higher risky scenarios and sovereign debt defaults, which 
accordingly2  have awaked new interest in assessing the effects of fiscal policy during an episode of 
economic or/and financial instability, mostly given the ineffectiveness of monetary policy alone to 
restore growth.  
 
The idea remains that fiscal stimulus could smooth the negative effects of the shocks and enable 
economic recovery, in coordination with monetary policy, but such policies have required higher fiscal 
deficits and most economies were facing hard budget constraints. Despite, policymakers have a very 
limited understanding of the impact of crises on economic activity and on the transmission mechanism 
of fiscal policy and vice versa, while the debate about quantitative effects of such interrelations is at 
the top of research agenda in economics3. Afonso, Baxa and Slavik, (2011) assume that the effects of 
fiscal policy on economic activity might be different from what is usually observed in normal times 
compared to unusual ones. The authors believe that the link between financial stress and fiscal policy 
can be two-sided. On the one hand, irrespectively of the causes of financial instability, policy makers 
may try to soften its effect on the economy. On the other hand, so-called “bad” policies can also 
contribute to financial instability. The idea is that during financial stress the quality of financial 
institutions’ assets deteriorates, as the share of non-performing loans increases and negative 
sentiments in the markets depress the value of other financial assets. As such, the disruptions in 
financial markets or problems in the banks’ balance sheets may trigger a recession by reducing the 
flow of credit to the other sectors. In addition, the European Banking Authority has placed some 
restrictions on banking lending, which among others include different countries lending risk weights 
and therefore different lending portfolio provisions. Under such criterion the banks find it more costly 
to lend to a less developed country compared to a more developed one. Therefore, on such 
arguments among other reasons, many banks have restricted their lending to the Central Eastern and 
South Eastern European countries to both the public and private sector. 
 
This material aims to evaluate the interactions between fiscal policy, output and financial market 
condition. The idea is that during episodes of economic downturn or stress in financial markets, the 
interaction between them might be different from what is usually observed in good or normal times. 
Such analysis has not been yet discussed and evaluated in the case of Central, Eastern and South 
Eastern Developing and Emerging European (CESEEDE) countries. Against this backdrop, this study 
employs a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) approach used by Afonso, et. al., (2011). It 
considers a panel dataset, for 10 Emerging Market and Developing economies in the Central East 
and South East European Countries, based on the IMF classification. The financial stress indicator 
(FSI) is taken by Shijaku (2014) and follows the work by Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca, (2012) and Kota 
and Saqe (2013). Then, threshold on FSI is calculated as in Balakrishnan, et. al., (2009) and support 
the study to analyses the relationship between variables of interest during good or bad episodes. 
Finally, the empirical work considers a structural identification approach as in Blanchard and Perrotti 
(2002), extended by Perrotti (2005). 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts on the regional 
countries in terms of financial and fiscal developments and on macroeconomic grounds. Section 3 
that follows discusses the empirical methodology and the construction of the financial stress index. 
Results will be commented on section 4. The last section offers concluding remarks.  
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II. STYLISED FACTS  
Broadly, all the countries in the CESEE that are considered as developing and emerging economies 
have undergone through a transition process that saw major economic, political and structural 
reforms in order to transform their economies into an open-market oriented system. The CESEEDE 
countries have been orientated toward trade liberalisation and have welcomed foreign capital inflows. 
However, all these countries have been highly export-dependent and very sensitive to patterns in 
trade-partners countries. Most of the countries have experience high growth rates fuelled by strong 
capital inflows and responsible fiscal policy, while monetary pressure have been under control. The 
global financial crises hit some of them at the first wave. The other countries were affected at a later 
stage, mostly through the lover economic performance mainly in the Eurozone. Liquidity dried up in 
financial markets and problems with the adequacy of bank capital came to the fore, driven by a 
general lack of confidence, increasing risk version and rapid deleveraging of balance sheets. Real 
economic performance has also weakened sharply. Some of them have resorted to the IMF and other 
international financial institutions to inject liquidity into their market. While most of these countries did 
not have toxic assets either in their banking system or overall in the economy because of contagion, 
the perception of the market has been fairly negative and unfortunately markets have put together in 
one overall category. Most of the central bank supported banks’ liquidity needs by abolishing 
marginal reserve requirement on both banks’ domestic and foreign liabilities, which released a part of 
banks’ currency reserves period of abundant capital circulation. 
 
Albania experienced a stable economic growth averaging to around 6% over the period 2001 to 
2008, accompanied by rapid reductions in poverty. Public finances were subject to major reformation, 
which ended in fiscal consolidation through expenditure cuts and revenues increase. The economy 
was faced with the effect of global crises enjoying a counter-cyclical fiscal policy during 2007 – 2009. 
After the privatisation on the Saving Bank in 2003, banking sector has increased mainly as foreign-
owned banks have entered the market. Consequently, lending saw a sharp boost to pick in year 
2008. The financial sector was largely spared from the severe fallout of the 2008-2009 financial 
crises since it was not heavily integrated into the global financial system. But, the economy was affect 
by the slowdown in economic performance in the Eurozone, especially in neighboring Greece and 
Italy (major trading partners of Albania with a large presence in the banking sector and also host to 
roughly one million Albanian emigrants). The economic output slowed down, but remained positive in 
each year from 2009 to 2013. Public debt has aggravated to reach to around 70% by 2013. The 
currency has devaluated by around 10 percentages. Lending has slowdown and banking system is 
faced with deteriorating non-performing loans4. However, banking system has been well capitalised 
and liquid, while the central bank has continuously in advance taken measure to support the banking 
system during the aggravating periods of financial crises.  
 
Bulgaria has benefited greatly from foreign direct investment and a responsible fiscal planning has 
contributed mostly to a steady pace of growth rate average of 6% a year. The government has 
managed to run a budget surplus of 3% and the economic growth rate has contributed to the 
enormous cuts in public debt, bridging it from 78.1% in early 2000s’ to only 13.4% at the beginning 
of 2009. The country suffered a difficult start in 2009 after some energy gas dispute. This shock was 
followed by the effect of global financial crises mainly drops in consumer spending and foreign 
investment that depressed growth to lower level. The real estate market, although not plummeting, 
ground to a halt, while unemployment remains through lower economic growth, raising 
unemployment consistently high. Banking system remained stable as banks allocated provisions 
adequate to the risk in their portfolios, strengthening credit risk protection and lower the pressures of 
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worsening loan quality by maintaining the stability of attracted funds, and cut costs. The Bulgarian 
National Bank helped to draft and implement measures to address the crisis, while major financial 
indicators reflected the risk in bank portfolios and witnesses to credit risk protection. Bulgaria’s banks 
preserved their profit generating potential, retaining good liquidity, and boosting capital positions5. 
 
Before the financial crises, the reshuffling of the Croatian economy led to an economic growth rate 
of 5.5% annually. Fiscal policy was oriented towards consolidation and as a result public debt came 
to around 30% in the end of 2008. Croatia remained relatively unscathed by the global financial 
turbulence, but macroeconomic environment started to deteriorate compared to previous years. The 
crises are followed by a six year of recession, having lost over 12% of its output6. At the same time, 
banks recorded an exceptionally strong upturn in domestic deposits as households and corporates 
transferred their assets from the capital market into banks. Public debt has pick above 64% of GDP in 
2013 and external debt will likely be close to 103% of GDP, while FDI dropped sharply by 2010. The 
Eurozone, especially Germany and Italy, is the source of half of Croatian trade, ad most of 75% of 
FDI inflow from this region. Banks ownership is concentrated to Eurozone member countries that 
exposes the banking sector Euro-area crises. Croatia financial intermediation has developed 
significantly and it continued to deepen. Substantial progress is shown in strengthening the regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks. In the aftermath of global crises the financial system is considered stable, 
but bank credit growth, deteriorating external imbalances and rising asset prices have accompanied 
rapid credit growth and have intensified risks7. 
 
Hungary economy suffered incredible hardships during the transition to a market 
economy. However, Hungarian economy is steadily growing by around 3.5% annually due to 
constant investments into transport and other services in the last 15 years. It has also experienced 
significant regional development and the encouragement of both foreign and domestic investment. 
Public finance has been characterized by persistence budget deficit, which has led to higher public 
debt. The Hungarian banking sector largely following the deleveraging trend after the global financial 
crises8. Banking system balance sheets have fallen by an average annual rate of around 5.5 percent 
since reaching their peak in 2008. The asset quality showed severe deterioration between 2009 and 
2011, while the currency has devaluated by around 25-30% since the crises. Hungary reached an 
agreement with the IMF and EU, by late 2008, for a rescue package of €20 billion, aiming to restore 
financial stability and investors' confidence9. Monetary easing has helped the return to growth, while a 
number of special taxes10 introduced over recent years have helped bring the budget deficit below 3% 
of GDP, but public debt still remains high at 80% of GDP. The mandate of the fiscal council is 
relatively narrow and it has a potentially very powerful veto over budget laws. Hungary has exited from 
recession in early 2013, but the recovery will be modest. 
 
Latvia has an open market economy and is part of Eurozone since 2014. The economy grew by 
more than 10% on average per year during 2000 – 07. But, the economy11 entered a severe recession 
after the financial crises in 2008 as a result of an unsustainable current account deficit, large debt 
exposure and easy credit bubble that began building up during 2004 that ended up in a budget, wage 
                                                          
5 Bulgarian National Bank, (2010), Bulgarian National Bank, (2011), Bulgarian National Bank, (2012),  
6 Croatian economy was badly affected by the Global Financial Crisis, and contracted by 6.9% in 2009, 1.4% in 2010, then showed signs 
of recovery in 2011 with 0.0% real GDP growth, but contracted again in 2012 by 1.8%.  
7  IMF (2008). Banking system has been still profitable and well capitalised, while stability was supported by very limited reliance on 
wholesale funding, which has been largely due to macroprudential central bank measures implemented in recent years to curb banks’ 
foreign borrowing. See also Croatian National Bank’s quarterly Financial Stability Reports. 
8 See: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2009) and other Report on Financial Stability. 
9 The package aimed to finance balance of payments, to raise its foreign exchange reserves and to set up a bank support scheme. 
10 The tax on banks’ balance sheets is likely to have reduced lending incentives. 
11 Triggered by the collapse of the second largest bank, Latvia had the worst economic performance in 2009, with annual growth rate 
averaging −18% and -20% in 2009. 
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and unemployment crisis. In response to the deteriorating quality of the loan portfolio, banks were 
compelled to build sizeable provisions for non-performing loans, thereby suffering record-high losses. 
Latvia reached an agreement with the EU, IMF and other international donors to defend the currency's 
peg to the euro in exchange for the government's commitment to stringent austerity measures. Fiscal 
policy 12  aimed to support economic recovery and stabilise the financial system by ease the risk 
perceptions of financial market participants and instigate higher foreign investors' interest 13, even 
though in 2010 public debt rose sharply to 43.9% of GDP from only 19.8% in 2008. 
 
Lithuania is one the Baltic countries that has had the fastest economic growth over the last decade, 
especially after entering the EU, expanding on average by around 10% annually. Responsible and 
contraction fiscal policy ended in debt reduction to around 35% of GDP in 2008. The rapid loan 
portfolio growth had a positive effect on consumption, while the loans related to acquisition and 
development of real estate constituted around half of outstanding bank loans to the private sector. All 
these led to high inflation of goods and services, as well as trade deficit. The global credit crunch 
effect the economy at a later stage mostly due to the high economic performance. However, the crises 
hit hardly the real estate and retail sectors14, while public debt has reached 40% of GDP in 20103. 
The financial sector concentrates mostly on the domestic market, while more than half of the banks 
belong to international corporations, mainly Scandinavian. By 2008, the loan portfolio was almost 
twice as big as that of deposits, showing a high on external financing. In the second half of 2008, the 
bank loan portfolio quality started to deteriorate and by 2009 the bank loan portfolio started to 
shrink. Still banking system managed to be profitable and well capitalised, which reflected better risk 
coverage by capital and hence higher loss absorption capacity. Bank of Lithuania lowered the reserve 
requirement and increased the maximum insurance coverage, made a positive contribution to the 
improvement of liquidity situation15. 
 
Poland is considered a major actor within the EU and its largest economy in Central Eastern Europe 
grew by around 4% annually in the period 2000 – 2004 and 7.5% until 2009. Fiscal policy has been 
characterised by persistence fiscal deficit due to higher public expenditure. Public debt reached 50% 
of GDP by 2004 from 35% in 2001, however came back to 40% by 2009 due to higher economic 
growth rate. Banking system has developed significantly and financial intermediation picked growth by 
2008. Since then the credit and deposit growth rate has decrease significantly16. Poland at first thrived 
even during the financial crisis, but the economy has slowed abruptly in the past couple of years. The 
Polish financial system has been in good condition, but the persisting crisis in global markets caused 
an increase of risk in the domestic interbank market liquidity resulting from a fall in banks’ mutual 
confidence17. In the medium term the risk to the financial system stability has increased owing to 
deteriorated outlook for economic growth resulting from economic slowdown among Poland’s main 
trade partners18. Banks’ potential difficulty in hedging foreign exchange positions was of particular 
significance owing to large portfolios of foreign exchange loans and the currency depreciation by 
around 25%. However, the sector has remained well capitalized, liquid, and profitable, even though 
                                                          
12 From 2008, restrictive fiscal policies were implemented which were among the most severe in Europe. Six consolidation packages were 
adopted from 2009 until 2012. Wage cuts in the public sector accounted for almost half of all spending cuts from 2009 until 2011, with 
wages falling by an average of 30 per cent. See also Dovladbekova, I., (2012). 
13 See Latvijas Banka, (2010) and Latvijas Banka, (2011) on Financial Stability Report. 
14 GDP plunged by 15.7% in the first nine months of 2009. Lithuania enjoys a small tax burden, as well as a skilled workforce and a well-
developed infrastructure, which have made it an attractive environment for business start-ups and foreign investors. 
15 See also Lietuvos Bankas [(2000); (2010), (2011)] on Financial Stability review; 
16 At the beginning of 2009, Poland's banking sector had 51 domestic banks, a network of 578 cooperative banks and 18 branches of 
foreign-owned banks. In addition, foreign investors had controlling stakes in nearly 40 commercial banks, which made up 68% of the 
banking capital. 
17 The deterioration in the financial condition of some of the Polish financial institutions’ strategic investors also leads to the fact that their 
subsidiary companies are exposed to the negative effects of the fall in confidence towards their parent companies, despite the subsidiary 
companies being in good financial condition. See also the National Bank of Poland (2008) (2009) (2010) on Financial Stability Reports. 
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accommodating monetary policy has not help weak credit growth. Poland’s government recently 
passed plans to limit the growth of spending as well as cut jobs in order to narrow the budget deficit 
and decrease the public debt19. 
 
Turkish economy grew by around 25% between 2000 – mid-2001, and then shrank sharply by 
around 13% during mid-2001 – end 2002, to return yet again at an average rate of 7% between 
2003 and 2006. Turkey managed to bring public debt to less than 60% by 2006, while the budget 
deficit decreased from more than 10% in early 2000 to less than 2% by 2007. Turkish banking sector 
is among the strongest and expansive continuously over time, while part of it operates foreign 
ownership. Financial intermediation has expanded positively by two-digit figure. While, the economy 
experiences some financial shocks in the early 2000s’, it managed to expand on average by 8% 
annually 2009 – 201220. Public debt reached at 50% level of GDP, despite an upward shift during 
2008 – 2009 cause by higher fiscal deficit. The Turkish banking sector21 maintains its strong capital 
structure as a result of the reforms implemented decisively in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. The 
banking sector continues to grow, accompanied by an on-going rise in the ratio of deposits and loans 
to the GDP and the ratio of loans to deposits, while being well capitalised and was strong enough to 
absorb the losses likely to be incurred under various shock assumptions. The BRSA approve by 2008 a 
regulation that made profits of bank part of the banks’ capital. However, the unfavourable 
developments in economic activity were associated by shifts in non-performing loans of banks and 
then to the banks’ profitability. 
 
The Macedonia economy experienced several shocks, but the hard on was during the domestic 
conflicts in 2001. Thereafter, the economy grew by an average of 6% annually until 2008, while by 
the time public debt reached only 20% of GDP compared to 50% it was in early 2000s’. The global 
crises had little impact on the economy, as the macroeconomic situation was in relativity good 
conditions and Macedonian banks' stringent rules. However, due to strong banking and trade ties to 
Eurozone, it was not able to avoid the strong adverse effect from the decline of export demands, the 
decrease of capital inflow and deteriorated expectation of economic entities, and consequently the 
decline of activities in the real economy, strengthened tendencies for accumulating foreign currency, 
reduced scope of capital inflow from abroad and the pressure for depreciation of the domestic 
currency. However, as a result of conservative fiscal policies and a sound financial system, the 
economy enjoyed improving rating indicators, which were also supported by a prudent monetary 
policy, which keeps the domestic currency pegged against the euro. Despite lowering base rate, the 
Central Bank22 has not changed liquidity indicators for banks or the reserve requirement since 2009, 
curbing credit growth to 7.5% in the first three-quarters of 2011. Macedonia became the first country 
eligible for the IMF’s Precautionary Credit Line in January 2011, while by the end of 2008 the 
Macedonian government had approved a “package of anti-crisis measures” 24-composed of ten 
measures in financial (nominal) value of about 20 billion MKD. 
 
Serbian is another country that has been discouraged by non-economic domestic shocks, but has 
managed to after 2002 to grow its economy by around 5 annually until 2008. Inflation pressure has 
been high, but decreasing over time due to responsible fiscal and monetary policies. Public debt has 
decreased from 200% of GDP in early 2000s’to less than 50% in the end of 2008, and then started 
increasing again as the government was fighting effects of world-wide 2008 financial crisis. Banking 
sector has developed and the financial market have integrated deeper, while most of the bank sector 
                                                          
19 National Bank of Poland, (2011) and (2012). 
20 In 2009 the Turkish government introduced various economic stimulus measures to reduce the impact of the 2007 – 2012 global 
financial crises such as temporary tax cuts on automobiles, home appliances, and housing.  
21 See also the CBRT (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) on Financial Stability Reports. 
22
 See also the NBRM (2009), NBRM (2010) and NBRM (2011) on the Financial Stability Report for the Republic of Macedonia. 
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is own by foreign capital. Macroeconomic indicators of Serbia have deteriorated seriously since 
October 2008, followed by drops in economic activity, currency deprecations, as well as the still high 
inflation, the balance of payment position also got aggravated, since the unfavourable international 
liquidity makes the financing of the current transaction deficit more difficult (the deficit will, 
nonetheless, be reduced in 2009)23. The liquidity of the real sector has been significantly decreased, 
while the banking sector lack of liquidity and portfolio quality (the assets of which are predominantly 
indexed in foreign currency) deterioration since October 2008. However, the situation was resisted 
successfully, with an adequate and timely support from the central bank and the government. 
However, during the year 2010, the most potent risk underlying the system remained credit risk, 
largely induced by indirect FX risk implied by the relatively high level of exchange rate indexation of 
banks’ portfolios24.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY  
A. MODEL SPECIFICATION APPROACH 
The empirical literature dealing with the effects of fiscal policy on economic growth or/and during 
the stress in financial markets is relatively scarce, but growing 25 . This paper approaches the 
methodology used by Afonso, et. al, (2011) for the estimation of a VAR model, which includes a 
threshold financial stress proxy in the fiscal VAR specification. The TVAR model is specified as follows: 
 
Xt = A
1Xt + B
1(L)Xt-1 + (A
2Xt + B
2(L)Xt-1) I[FSIt-d>λ] + Ut                           (1) 
 
Where, Xt denotes a vector of endogenous variables such as output, inflation, fiscal variable, short 
term interest rate and a financial condition indicator, I is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 
if financial stress is higher than the threshold value λ, and 0 otherwise. The time lag will be set at 1. 
B1(L) and B2(L) are lag polynomial matrices, A1Yt and A
2Yt represent the contemporaneous terms, 
because contemporaneous effects might also differ across the regimes. Ut is structural disturbance. It 
is assumed that matrices A1 and A2 have a recursive structure. 
 
The TVAR model uses a recursive identification scheme and the model specification is built upon the 
variables such as GDP growth (Y), inflation rate (P), debt burden (f), short term interest rate (i) and a 
dummy proxy for financial market conditions (FSI), for which I consider a systemic financial stress 
indicator (SFSI) estimated by Shijaku (2014) that consist on the set of information such as those used 
by Holló, et. al, (2012) and Kota and Saqe (2013) and takes the value of 1 if financial stress is higher 
than a threshold value calculated as in Balakrishnan, et. al, (2009), and 0 otherwise. The TVAR model 
can be specified as: 
 
 
 
(2) 
             
Where, Xt is a vector of the endogenous variables given by Xt = [Yt, Pt, ft, it, st], c is a (5x1) vector of 
constant term, βi is a matrix of autoregressive coefficient of order (5x5) and εt is the vector of random 
disturbances. Based on Afonso, et. al. (2011) the TVAR model is built to capture fiscal developments 
by only on variable (namely debt-to-GDP ratio), as it reflects developments both in revenues and 
                                                          
23 See also the NBS (2008), NBS (2008), NBS (2008) on the Financial Stability Report for the Republic of Serbia. 
24 See also the NBS, (2011) and NBS, (2012) 
25 See also Balke (2000), Atanasova (2003), Berkelmans (2005), Baldacci, Gupta, Mulas-Granados, (2009), Li and St-Amant (2010), 
Turrini, Röger, Székely, (2010), Afonso, et. al., (2011), Ferraresi, et. al., (2013).  
 
 
- 8 - 
expenditure and is a key variables which determines fiscal sustainability. It captures the extraordinary 
government actions that may not be fully reflected in the fiscal balance (e.g. purchase of financial 
assets, recapitalisation of banking sector or any debt adjustments). It has a closer link to financial 
markets than the fiscal balance because it partly captures also the risk related to the refinancing of the 
outstanding stock of government debt, while influencing as well interest rates. It changes in the debt 
ratio have an impact on the corporate sector expectations, consumption sentiment of households and 
on financial market conditions, since it provides information not only about the current fiscal policy 
but about past fiscal policies. 
 
The TVAR model employs a panel framework to avoid spurious regression due to low number of 
observations in the high financial stress regime. This panel set considers 10 Emerging Market and 
Developing economies in the Central East and South East European Countries. The panel sample 
study is based on the IMF 2013 classification. It includes Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, and Turkey26. The model specification incorporates a dummy 
variable (Dummy_EU) to distinguish for the period of EU membership for some of the sample 
countries. It will take the value of 1 for the period when a country has been part of EU, and 0 
otherwise. The panel approach advantages are threefold 27 . First, it provides more information 
contained in the cross-section dimension, while the unit root tests are more powerful than the 
conventional ones. Second, it reduces the probability of a spurious regression, while the variances are 
both cross-sectional and time series related. Third, the cross-country dependence can mirror common 
changes in fiscal behaviour authorities due to increasing economic synchronization across all 
countries. The used of VAR model is very suitable because it imposes very little theoretical structure on 
the data and can be used to establish some relevant stylized facts. On the other hand, the TVAR 
approach advantage is twofold. In the one hand, it makes it possible to analyse the impulse response 
functions under different financial stress regime switches. On the other hand, the variable by which 
regimes are defined can itself be an endogenous variable included in the VAR.  
 
The ordering28 of the variables in the TVAR model reflects some assumptions about the links in the 
economy29. The variable of FSI is ordered last assuming it reacts contemporaneously very quickly to all 
types of shocks in the system and all new changes in both macroeconomic aggregates and economic 
policy that occur during one quarter are transmitted to financial markets within this quarter30. The 
ordering of fiscal variable after output is motived by the need to identify the effects of automatic 
stabilizers in the economy 31  and following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), it is assumed that all 
reactions of fiscal policy within each quarter are purely automatic because of implementation lags of 
fiscal policy measures. Monetary policy shocks are assumed to be shocks to the short-term interest 
rates that do not have an impact, contemporaneously, on output and inflation. To that end, yet again 
the interest rate variable shows up after the fiscal variable since the short-term interest rate can react 
contemporaneously to fiscal policy, but not vice versa. However, Li and Amant, (2010) assumed that 
interest rate shocks can have a contemporaneous impact on the FSI. 
 
Further to that, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), 
this paper employs a structural TVAR approach since there are many factors, exogenous to fiscal 
                                                          
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania were not included due to the relatively short data disponibility. 
27 See also Barnerjee, (1999); Gali and Perotti (2003); Wyplosz (2006); Staehr (2008); Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009); Afonso and Jalles 
(2011). 
28 See also Balke (2000); Blanchard and Perotti, (2002); Atanova, (2003); Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Afonso, et. al. (2011); and 
Ferraresi, et. al. (2013). 
29 Following Li and Amant, (2010), alternative orderings were considered, but it turned out that the choice of alternative orderings makes 
little difference. 
30 Balke (2000) and Atanova, (2003) use similar assumptions. 
31 See also Afonso, et. al., (2011) and Ferraresi, et. al., (2013). 
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shocks, which contribute to the movements in fiscal variables. First, the STVAR identification 
approach32 is based on the recursive approach introduced by Sims (1980) and can posit the following 
relationship between the reduced-form residuals and the structural shocks: 
  
 
 (3) 
             
Where, ut [ , , , , ] represent the reduced-form disturbances or the corresponding 
innovation; et [ ] is the vector of structural shocks, which are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with each other; αij are shock parameters, based on a A(L) matrix of VAR parameters and 
B structural matrix associated with innovations. Then, the study follows the identification scheme 
introduced by the Blanchard and Perrotti (2002), extended by Perrotti (2005) as their materials 
employed a five variable VAR model, as follows: 
  
 
 
(4) 
 
Where, αij are the shocks parameter to be estimated; ãij = [ãyf; ãfy; ãif] are elasticity which are 
estimated outside the STVAR model 33 ; and others as previously described. The structural TVAR 
identification is built upon some assumptions. First, it is assumed that economic activity is affected by 
fiscal developments both in the short run and long run34, as well as price level have an effect on 
economic activity and vice versa 35 . Following previous research 36  it is assumed interest rate are 
effected by shocks of economic activity, price level and fiscal developments, while financial markets 
respond very quickly to all types of shocks in the system identified. Finally, the identification scheme 
follows a parsimonious approach to account only for the significant shocks to be estimated.  
 
B. THE DATA 
In the context of this paper, the empirical model evaluates the fiscal developments, output and 
financial stress through means of STVAR approach using data on debt burden, economic growth, 
inflation, short-term interest and financial market condition index. The sample data ranges from the 
first quarter of 2000 to the last quarter of 2013. The choice of the data sample is motivated by the 
willingness to study a relatively coherent time period link to the introduction of Euro currency as far as 
to account for the data availability for some of the sample country. The data sample consists of 
dynamic balanced panel countries including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
FYR Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, and Turkey according to the IMF 2013 classification for the 
                                                          
32 The structural identification reflects some short run restricted type assumptions [Ae=Bu where E[uu']=I] emplaced, with a [(n2 + n) / 2] 
total number of restrictions allowed in order to achieve idendtification.  
33 This elasticity are calculated based on a OLS estimation techniques and can be provided upon request. 
34 See also Hakkio and Rush (1991); Cuddington (1997); Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, (2011). 
35 See also Uhlig, (2004); Calza and Sousa, (2005); Mancellari, (2011). 
36 See also Li and Amant (2010); Afonso, et. al., (2011). 
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Emerging Market and Developing economies in the Central East and South East European Countries. 
The data are grouped into two main categories: data to construct the financial condition index and 
the other group of data for the estimation purpose. The former are taken from the empirical work as 
explained in Shijaku (2014). The latter includes GDP, inflation, debt burden, short-term interest and 
FSI. GDP presents the real quarterly GDP. The price level is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
as the first difference of the logarithm of CPI. Debt burden represent the ratio of nominal public debt 
to the GDP level. Finally, 3-TBill rate is a proxy for the short-term interest rate. Instead the analysis is 
based also on the 12-TBill rate as alternative variables for sensitive analysis in turn of lasing period 
effects. All the data entered the model as annual growth rate, besides the financial stress indicator. 
The data are constructed for 10 emerging and developing countries, for the period 1999 Q01 – 
2013 Q04. The data are taken from European Institute of Statistics (Eurostat), National Central Banks 
and Ministry of Finance as explained in Table 1 in Appendix. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The unit root test rests, reported in Table 2 in the Appendix, reject the null hypothesis at the 
conventional significance statistical level for all the variables. Variables included at the specified 
model are considered as stationary and the model TVAR is estimated in level. The appropriate 11 lag 
length TVAR model was based on the SIC criteria, stability condition and LM test for serial correlation, 
while diagnostic tests (See Table 4 and Diagram 1 in Appendix) satisfy condition on stability, 
autocorrelation, normality, etc. Empirical results on impulse response are based on a parsimonious 
shock identification scheme represented in Table 5 in Appendix. Results suggest that only inflationary 
and interest shocks have a statistical significant effect. The shock on  are estimated to affect  
negatively by round 0.664pp and the shock on ι is found to boost negative effect on s by round 
0.137pp. The estimated effect of  and  suggests that the innovation shock have a great impact on 
financial and money markets. The is found to have a relatively smaller effect on the debt ratio level, 
while the  and have a relatively very small coefficient. 
 
Results by impulse response are shown in Figure 1 – 8. In a high financial stress regime, ƒ shifts 
upward by around 0.1pp in response of 1pp negative shock on debt patterns. This impact is estimated 
to be significant and it will pick 0.5pp after 6 quarters. This impact is small and takes a longer time to 
materialise during low stress regime. The 1pp negative shock leads to a 0.08pp after 1 quarter and 
reaches a maximum value of 0.4pp after 8 quarters. The effect of negative fiscal shock during high 
stress regime is transmitted to γ, but the accumulating impact is relatively small. Output initially 
decreases by around 0.01pp in response of a 1pp negative shock in ƒ and picks up at round 0.04pp 
after 4 quarters. The effect is statistically insignificant after 8 quarters. When the budget deficit was 
used instead of the ƒ, the results are slightly different. A negative 1pp shock in fiscal deficit is found to 
be accomplished by an initial non-significant effect, but the accumulated response becomes 
statistically significant and picks gradually at 0.2pp after 8 quarterly. The response of output to a 
negative deficit shock is associated with an initial small negative effect, which picks up at round 0.1pp 
after 10 quarters and is always statistically significant37. During a low stress regime, the negative 1pp 
of ƒ shock reaches at a maximum of 0.04pp after 6 quarter and is statistically insignificant after 10 
quarters. Fiscal patterns are found to have no effect of inflation pressure regardless of the state of 
stress regime, but are found to cause a negative effect on money market. During high stress regime, 
T-Bill rate will increase by 0.02pp in response of a 1pp negative shock in ƒ. It reached 0.1pp after 6 
quarter, which is the period found to be statistically significant. The effect is found slightly greater and 
lasts longer statistically in the case of 12 months T-Bill rate rather the 3 months T-Bill rate. One 
preliminary reason to this might be the changing structure of debt towards longer maturities, since 
                                                          
37 In a robustness check attempt, negative fiscal shock is found to increase the output gap, but the effect is statistically insignificant. 
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fiscal authorities in the CESEEDE countries have swap the 3 months debt auctions in favour of longer 
maturities, mostly 12 months. The effect was found relatively the same when deficit was used instead. 
Money market rate are not affected initially, but in response of 1pp in deficit picks to round 0.2pp 
after 8 quarters.  
 
Further to that, fiscal developments are less dominant during the low stress regime. The effect of a 
negative shock takes longer to materialize, while the magnitude is even smaller compared to the high 
stress regime. Negative fiscal developments are found to create reverse effect on financial stress, but 
such effect is statistically insignificant during both regimes. This is not surprising new. Most of the 
government in each CESEEDE countries have pursued responsible and consolidating fiscal policies. 
These countries have lowered pressure on domestic market by orienting debt management policies 
toward foreign borrowing and longer maturities. Meanwhile, deteriorating fiscal stance was a result of 
the economic slowdown in the aftermath of financial crises and the higher risk perception by financial 
institutions. However, a strong response is found when deficit indicator is used instead. Market 
conditions are found to deteriorate by 0.25pp in response of 1pp increase in fiscal deficit and 
maximise at 0.5pp after 4 quarters. This impact is found to be statistically significant. Afonso, et. al. 
(2011) view debt developments compare to deficit patterns, as longer term policy indicator. Thus, the 
estimated impact might be a result of the ability of financial market in CESEEDE to facilitate moment 
and longer term shocks38.  
 
During high stress regime, output innovations are found to increase growth rate by 0.04pp in 
response to a 1pp positive shock. The effect is statistically significant and accumulated effect 
maximises at round 0.1pp after 4 quarters. This effect is higher and statistically significant during low 
stress regime. A 1pp positive shock leads to around 0.1pp after 1 quarter and stabilises at around 
0.2pp in 4 quarters. The effect of γ on ƒ is found to be greater than vice versa. During high stress 
regime, ƒ is found to decrease after one quarter in response of positive output shock. The 
accumulated impact maximises at round -0.15pp corresponding to a 1pp increase in γ after 6 
quarters, but becomes statistically insignificant after 10 quarters. Improving fiscal stance patterns is 
also found when deficit is used instead, even though the effect is statistically insignificant. Despite the 
same behaviour, the impact of output innovation is found to be relatively stronger during normal time. 
A 1pp positive shock in γ brings a 0.25pp cuts in ƒ. Financial markets are found to react positively to 
better economic performance. The accumulated effect becomes significant after 2 quarters, and 
reaches 0.25pp in response of 1pp boost in economic growth. However, during both regimes the 
effect is found to be statistically significant after 6 quarters. Inflationary pressures are found to be 
influenced by Keynesian demand side effects. Price level would not react initially in a high stress 
regime, but the accumulated impact stabilises at round 0.06pp after 12 quarters in response to a 1pp 
positive output shocks. This behaviour is relatively similar also during normal times, but the 
accumulated impact reaches 0.1pp after 10 quarters. During financial instability, money market rates 
react statistically significant after 4 quarters, while the accumulated effect reaches 0.3pp after 10 
quarters and stabilised thereafter, in response of initial output innovations. However, during normal 
times, the effect of positive output shock takes longer time to materialise, but reaches 0.6pp after 10 
quarters.  
 
There is a strong and statistically significant inertia in financial market, which is found to be more 
persistent during financial instability. The effect of a 1pp negative shock in financial stress during bad 
time is transmitted by around 0.25pp in the next quarter. This effect accumulates at round 0.48pp in 4 
quarters and then diminishing. This behaviour is observed even when deficit is used as a fiscal 
indicator, but it is found to be lower than the magnitude found in ƒ.  During normal time, positive 
                                                          
38 The impact of deficit increases is found to be weaker during low stress regime both in terms of the magnitude and lasting periods. 
 
 
- 12 - 
shock in s improve market conditions by around 0.22pp after 1 quarter and reach the maximum effect 
at around 0.4pp in 5 quarters. During high stress regime, stressful markets provide negative stimulus 
for economic activity, while easing stress and sound financial situation policies boost growth. The 
effect of market condition materialise more during high stress regime. During these episodes, a 1pp 
stress increase of s is associated by round 0.04pp negative stimulus on output growth. The effect 
reaches 0.8pp after 8 quarters and is throughout statistically significant. During low stress regime, 
sound financial market boost growth by around 0.03pp after 4 quarter and reach the maximum effect 
by around 0.07pp after 8 quarters. Still, the based on the magnitude, the effect of market conditions 
on economic activity remains relatively small. 
 
The effect of market stress is more evident regarding fiscal developments. The analyses suggest that 
the effect of market condition on fiscal developments is more evident during bad times than normal 
times. During high stress regime, a 1pp increase in  is statistically significant and is transmitted to 
raising ƒ after one quarters. The effect reaches 0.1pp in four quarters and picks up at 0.3pp in 8 
quarters and then diminishes throughout. This effect is also observed when deficit is used instead. 
However, during low stress regime, better market condition by 1pp leads to a low initial improvement 
in the fiscal stance, which reaches 0.05pp cuts after 4 quarters and maximise the effect at around 
0.25pp after 8 quarters. At the same time, T-Bill rates seem to be affected negatively during financial 
instability and improve during normal times, even though the relationship is found to be statistically 
insignificant. This behaviour is also observed at price level. Even though relatively small, the 
decreasing accumulated response to stressing market becomes statistically significant after six quarters 
only in the case of financial instability. Price level seems to under demand side effects during normal 
time, but the relationship is relatively small and statistically insignificant. 
 
Empirical results by variance decomposition (Table 6) show that volatility in economic performance 
and price level has been low both during high and low stress regime. Regarding other variables, 
standard error increases over time, despite the state of financial market condition. Shocks in output 
activity are explained more by the autoregressive behaviour. Financial developments contribute to 
growth volatility more during a high stress regime compared to low stress regime. After 10 quarters, it 
represents round 28.5% during bad times and nearly 18% during normal times. Despite 
autoregressive influence, during high stress regime price level shocks are caused also by output and 
financial condition. The former, accounts more during normal times, which reaches nearly 20% after 
10 quarters. Further to that shocks in the T-Bill rates are mostly cause by their autoregressive 
behaviour. At the same time, fiscal policy decision-making seems to contribute mostly to fiscal 
developments. However, in a low stress regime, the market condition causes nearly 20% of overall 
volatility, which goes to nearly 35% during high stress regime. Economic activity is also another 
source, but its impact does not exceed 10% in either of regimes. Finally, as in the other variables, 
financial shocks also are influenced by autoregressive behaviour, which is more persistence during 
high stress regime. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The global financial crises revealed a strong interaction between fiscal policy, output and financial 
market condition. The 2008 – 2009 negative shocks in advance economies were quickly transmitted 
to developing and emerging markets though financial and trade linkages. Although, some of the 
Central Eastern and South Eastern countries were not hit at the first wave, they were all faced with 
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Slowdown in foreign capital inflows and widening of spreads 
on sovereign debt, were accomplished by sharp and huge currency depreciation, while equity and 
debt funds saw significant withdrawals, and lending by advanced economies’ banks dropped 
precipitously reflecting both a weakened outlook and the need for banks to de-leverage. Most of these 
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economies pursued fiscal stimulus and easing monetary and financial conditions to smooth the 
negative effects of shocks and enable economic recovery, but were all faced with hard budget 
constraints and raising debt, placing more stress to financial markets via higher risky scenarios and 
sovereign debt defaults. 
 
This material aimed to analyse the interrelation between fiscal policy, output and financial market 
condition developments in the case of Central Eastern and South Eastern Developing and Emerging 
economies during episodes of economic downturn or stress in financial markets. The paper follows a 
two-step procedure. First, it uses a binary approach to identify periods that signal stress on financial 
market, which is an aggregated composition of four sub-indexes that allow capturing a better stress 
realistic index through different financial market segments. Second, it specify a threshold vector 
autoregressive approach for ten CESEEDE countries  based on a structural identification approach 
and analyses results based on accumulated impulse response function during high and low stress 
regime. 
 
The empirical results subject to the focus of the study are relatively satisfying. They suggest that there 
is a strong fiscal inertia, especially during high stress regime. Deteriorating fiscal policy has a relatively 
small negative effect on output during both low and high stress regime. However, positive economic 
innovations are found to improve much more the fiscal stance. The effect is greater during low stress 
regime, even though the ability of fiscal policy to affect output evolved over time. Indeed, stress in 
financial market is found to impact the fiscal stance rather than vice versa, even though market 
condition are more sensitive to short term shocks or/and policies compared to long term ones. The 
effect of market condition is greater during high stress regime. Financial stress is found to have a 
strong negative effect on output growth, even though relatively smaller in both regimes compared to 
the improving financial stance caused by higher growth rate. Fiscal patterns are found to have no 
effect of inflation pressure, but are found to cause a negative effect on money market, especially on 
longer term maturities. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 Fiscal Indicator during 2001 Q01 – 2013 Q04. 
 
 
 
               Source: IMF, National Ministry of Finance, National Central Banks, Eurostat, National Institue of Statistics
Figure 2 Composite-related Financial Stress Indicator. 
 
 
 
                      Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 3 The Financial Stress Indicator and the Estimated Threshold. 
 
 
 
                      Source: Author’s Calculations  
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Table 1 Unit Root Test Results 
Variable 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 
Level First difference 
Intercept 
Intercept 
and trend 
None Intercept 
Intercept 
and trend 
None 
Y [0.0000] [0.0000] -  [0.0000] [0.0000] -  
P [0.0000] [0.0005] -  [0.0000] [0.0000] -  
f [0.0001] [0.0317] -  [0.0000] [0.0000] -  
i [0.0000] [0.0000] -  [0.0000] [0.0000] -  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
Y [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
P [0.0000] [0.0027] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
f [0.0000] [0.0101] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
i [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
PP – Fisher Chi-square 
Y [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
P [0.0000] [0.0039] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
f [0.0013] [0.1081] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
i [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Y [0.1631] [0.6245] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
P [0.0235] [0.3229] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
f [0.1285] [0.4756] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
i [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Exogenous variables: None 
User-specified lags: 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
Table 2 VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null: no SC at lag order h; Sample: 2001Q1 2013Q3; Included observations: 
441; Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
Lags LM-Stat Prob Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  22.74003  0.5927 7  24.53671  0.4886 
2  19.16561  0.7891 8  30.10505  0.2204 
3  20.75113  0.7064 9  23.29983  0.5601 
4  39.50923  0.3027 10  21.80035  0.6472 
5  32.62577  0.1407 11  27.42968  0.3348 
6  22.34835  0.6156 12  24.87888  0.4692 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 4 Stability test on the 11-lag TVAR model. 
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Table 3 Restriction identification 
 Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I 
Restriction Type: short-run pattern matrix 
 
Coef. Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.644 0.1402 4.6 0.000 
C(2) -0.137 0.0551 -2.5 0.013 
C(3) 0.038 0.0013 29.7 0.000 
C(4) 0.013 0.0004 29.7 0.000 
C(5) 0.088 0.0030 29.7 0.000 
C(6) 0.195 0.0066 29.7 0.000 
C(7) 0.228 0.0077 29.7 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 5 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the output shock during 
high stress regime. 
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        Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the fiscal shock during 
high stress regime. 
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        Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 7 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the deficit shock during 
high stress regime. 
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        Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the stress shock during 
high stress regime. 
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        Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 9 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the stress shock during 
high stress regime. 
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 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Figure 10 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the output shock 
during low stress regime. 
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 Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 11 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of the fiscal shock during 
low stress regime. 
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 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 12 Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. of stress regime shock 
during low stress regime. 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of (Y) to (s)
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of (P) to (s)
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of (f) to (s)
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of (i) to (s)
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of (s) to (s)
 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4. Variance decomposition results 
During High Stress Regime During Low Stress Regime 
Variance Decomposition of γ: 
Period S.E. γ Ρ ƒ ι s S.E. γ Ρ ƒ ι: s 
1 0.037 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.038 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.043 96.9 0.2 0.1 0.8 1.9 0.044 97.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.5 
3 0.049 91.6 0.3 1.3 2.3 4.5 0.051 90.2 0.3 2.0 1.7 5.9 
4 0.055 81.2 0.3 3.0 4.3 11.2 0.057 83.9 0.2 4.3 2.5 9.0 
5 0.058 72.7 0.8 3.5 5.8 17.2 0.060 75.9 0.5 5.6 3.1 14.9 
6 0.062 64.7 2.4 3.1 6.1 23.7 0.062 71.8 1.5 5.5 3.6 17.6 
7 0.065 59.4 5.1 2.9 5.7 27.0 0.063 69.5 3.2 5.3 3.9 18.1 
8 0.067 56.3 7.7 2.7 5.4 27.8 0.064 66.9 5.2 5.1 4.1 18.6 
9 0.068 54.3 9.2 2.6 5.2 28.7 0.065 65.9 6.3 5.0 4.6 18.3 
10 0.068 53.9 9.9 2.6 5.2 28.5 0.065 65.5 6.8 4.9 4.7 18.1 
 Variance Decomposition of Ρ: 
1 0.013 5.1 94.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.013 4.4 95.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.019 2.7 97.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.019 2.2 97.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 
3 0.023 1.8 98.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.024 1.5 98.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 
4 0.027 1.5 98.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.027 1.5 98.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 
5 0.028 4.4 93.9 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.029 4.8 93.6 0.6 0.1 0.9 
6 0.030 7.4 88.2 1.3 0.5 2.7 0.031 8.2 88.0 1.4 0.2 2.2 
7 0.031 10.8 81.6 1.4 0.7 5.5 0.032 12.2 82.0 1.6 0.2 4.0 
8 0.032 13.7 75.9 1.3 0.7 8.5 0.033 15.9 77.3 1.5 0.4 4.9 
9 0.033 15.7 72.2 1.3 0.7 10.1 0.034 18.4 73.8 1.5 1.0 5.3 
10 0.034 16.9 70.0 1.3 0.8 11.0 0.035 20.0 71.5 1.4 1.5 5.6 
 Variance Decomposition of ƒ: 
1 0.075 0.1 0.5 99.4 0.0 0.0 0.075 0.1 0.8 99.1 0.0 0.0 
2 0.100 2.5 2.7 92.8 0.7 1.2 0.101 3.2 2.9 92.2 0.8 0.9 
3 0.123 5.5 2.8 87.1 0.5 4.1 0.124 6.6 3.3 87.2 0.7 2.1 
4 0.153 6.8 2.6 83.2 0.7 6.7 0.157 8.5 3.1 83.1 2.1 3.2 
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5 0.165 8.7 2.3 75.9 1.1 12.0 0.170 11.1 2.8 76.8 2.8 6.4 
6 0.177 8.6 2.2 70.3 1.3 17.7 0.182 11.2 2.5 72.4 3.3 10.6 
7 0.189 7.8 2.4 64.3 1.7 23.8 0.193 10.6 2.4 68.1 4.5 14.4 
8 0.199 7.1 3.6 58.2 1.8 29.4 0.199 10.1 2.8 64.5 5.1 17.5 
9 0.207 6.5 4.8 54.2 1.7 32.8 0.203 9.8 3.4 62.7 5.7 18.5 
10 0.211 6.4 5.6 52.2 1.6 34.2 0.205 9.7 3.8 61.6 6.0 18.9 
 Variance Decomposition of ι: 
1 1.212 0.0 0.3 6.5 93.1 0.0 0.199 0.1 0.0 7.0 92.9 0.0 
2 1.782 0.0 0.7 6.1 93.2 0.0 0.281 0.1 0.1 6.6 93.2 0.0 
3 2.147 0.0 1.5 5.1 93.3 0.1 0.326 0.1 0.6 6.6 92.7 0.1 
4 2.320 0.0 2.2 4.6 92.6 0.5 0.346 0.2 1.0 6.8 91.8 0.2 
5 2.482 0.6 3.4 4.2 91.0 0.9 0.350 1.1 1.6 6.7 90.2 0.5 
6 2.628 1.0 6.0 3.7 88.1 1.2 0.355 2.0 2.4 7.1 88.1 0.5 
7 2.732 1.3 8.0 3.6 86.1 1.1 0.360 2.9 2.8 7.1 86.8 0.4 
8 2.820 1.9 9.0 3.4 84.6 1.2 0.365 4.1 2.7 7.2 85.4 0.5 
9 2.883 2.2 8.9 3.3 84.4 1.3 0.369 4.8 2.7 7.3 83.6 1.6 
10 2.946 3.2 8.7 3.2 83.7 1.3 0.374 5.4 2.8 7.6 81.3 3.0 
 Variance Decomposition of s: 
1 0.236 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 98.3 0.222 2.5 0.4 1.9 0.0 95.1 
2 0.271 0.1 0.5 1.8 2.8 94.8 0.247 2.9 2.0 2.7 0.6 91.9 
3 0.282 1.0 0.9 1.7 3.0 93.4 0.262 2.5 1.9 4.4 5.9 85.3 
4 0.288 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.9 92.8 0.269 2.7 1.8 4.2 7.2 84.1 
5 0.291 1.2 2.3 2.0 3.0 91.5 0.271 2.9 2.2 4.2 7.6 83.1 
6 0.292 1.6 2.5 2.0 3.3 90.7 0.273 3.1 2.7 4.7 7.6 81.9 
7 0.293 2.1 2.6 2.0 3.3 90.0 0.274 3.7 2.7 4.8 7.5 81.3 
8 0.294 2.3 2.6 2.1 3.4 89.6 0.278 4.9 2.7 4.8 8.3 79.3 
9 0.295 2.4 2.6 2.2 3.5 89.3 0.285 5.4 2.5 4.7 11.1 76.3 
10 0.299 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.6 88.9 0.290 5.5 2.5 4.9 11.8 75.3 
Cholesky Ordering: γ, Ρ, ƒ, ι, s  
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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